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INTRODUCTION 
Vine Deloria, Jr., the greatest indigenous philosopher of his day, wrote 
Custer Died for Your Sins: An Indian Manifesto in 1969. 1 It was a spirited 
polemic that both galvanized and inspired Native peoples at home and 
abroad. Simultaneously, the book's powerful and trenchant words sent 
shock waves through non-Indian society. Deloria articulated a resurgent 
indigenous-centered understanding of sovereignty that had largely been 
suppressed by federal policy and law for nearly a century. 2 Why did he em-
phasize the word "sovereignty"? Because he knew that Native nations need-
ed to employ such concepts since they were familiar to both federal and 
state lawmakers. And Natives had learned over the last several centuries 
that institutional and conceptual familiarity on the part of whites are im-
portant if they are to make any headway against the powerful forces that are 
still arrayed against them. 
Largely through the force of his intellectual rigor and wordsmith tal-
ents, the terms "tribal sovereignty"3 and the related phrase "self-
determination"4 became powerful rallying cries for indigenous peoples as 
they set about the gargantuan, and not yet completed, task of throwing off 
the yoke of federal domination cloaked in paternalism and fear; state efforts 
aimed at terminating, belittling, or denying the legitimacy of indigenous 
governments; and corporate attempts to exploit the few remaining natural 
resources still under nominal tribal control. Of course, Deloria also skew-
I. VINE DELORIA, JR., CUSTER DIED FOR YOUR SINS: AN INDIAN MANIFESTO (1988). 
2. See id. at 144. 
3. !d. 
4. !d. at 180. 
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ered other institutions and professions-like churches and anthropologists-
who had previously had largely unfettered control to do whatever they 
wanted to or for Native peoples. 
Deloria had this to say about sovereignty in Custer: 
If responsibility is irrelevant, sovereignty is not. States have sovereignty, counties 
have sovereignty, cities and towns have sovereignty, water districts have sover-
eignty, school boards have sovereignty. Why shouldn't tribes have total sovereign-
ty? Originally they did. Treaties recognize this basic fact of legal existence. Tribes 
agreed to go to the reservations provided they could have their basic community 
rights of self-government. 5 
Deloria here was employing a most basic definition of sovereignty-that it 
is the power to govern-which is why he equated these various political 
entities together, even though state sovereignty is clearly of a different type 
than that wielded by school boards. 
Later on that same page, he then expounded more specifically upon 
the distinctive relationship between Native nations and the federal govern-
ment when he noted: 
Congressional policy should recognize the basic right to tribal sovereignty. Such 
sovereignty should include all promises contained in treaties and should recognize 
the eligibility of tribal governments for all federal programs which are opened to 
counties and cities. In this way the onus of having failed the Indian people would 
not be placed on Interior or Congress. Tribes would be free to develop or not, ac-
cording to the desires of the people in the tribe.6 
In both passages, Deloria was acting upon two fundamental ideas that 
he would adhere to throughout his prolific public life: reaffirming for Native 
peoples their inherent right to be self-governing; and reminding the federal 
government that Native nations, as the original, senior, and treaty-signing 
sovereigns on the hemisphere, deserved respect. 
Within a decade of Custer's release, indigenous peoples made signifi-
cant strides towards resurrecting and exercising increasing amounts of sov-
ereign authority. These strides were aided and abetted by a number of im-
portant congressional statutes, presidential policy statements, Supreme 
Court rulings, and public sentiments that were, for a time, generally sup-
portive of indigenous assertions of rights. 7 Nevertheless, by the late 1970s, a 
5. /d. at 144. 
6. /d. at 144-45. 
7. See generally ALVIN M. JOSEPH¥, JR., RED POWER: THE AMERICAN INDIANS' 
FIGHT FOR FREEDOM (Alvin M. Josephy, Jr., Joane Nagel & Troy R. Johnson eds., 2d ed. 
1999); VINE DELORIA, JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES: AN INDIAN 
DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE (Univ. Tex. Pressed. 1985); MARK N. TRAHANT, THE LAST 
GREAT BATTLE OF THE INDIAN WARS: HENRY M. JACKSON, FORREST J. GERARD AND THE 
CAMPAIGN FOR THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF AMERICA'S INDIAN TRIBES (2010); GEORGE 
PIERRE CASTILE, To SHOW HEART: NATIVE AMERICAN SELF-DETERMINATION AND FEDERAL 
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swelling backlash by non-Indians and federal policymakers was evident, 
aimed at corralling or, in some cases, completely terminating Native peo-
ples' recently reasserted rights. This anti-Indian activity corresponded with 
a slow rise of activity in Indian country by some tribal officials who--
having felt empowered by the recent spate of supportive federal laws and 
favorable court rulings that broadly, if gingerly, affirmed tribal sovereign-
ty-began to issue their own rulings and pronouncements that sometimes 
had devastating consequences for the rights of individual indigenous citi-
zens. 
I. DECIDING WHO BELONGS AND ON WHAT GROUNDS 
In 1978, the United States Supreme Court handed down Santa Clara 
Pueblo v. Martinez, which reaffirmed tribal governments' internal sover-
eignty by declaring that they retained as one of their inherent powers the 
right to decide who could or could not be citizens of their nations. 8 This 
case reverberated through Indian country. 9 On the one hand, it was a solid 
pronouncement and reaffirmed one of the essential characteristics of any 
sovereign-the power to decide who belongs to their polity. On the other 
hand, it was a stark reminder of how fragile human rights were for individu-
al tribal members who otherwise met the membership criteria established by 
their nations. 
The same year Santa Clara was decided, another Deloria, Philip 
(Sam) Deloria, 10 made a powerful, almost prophetic, statement warning 
about the inherent dangers if Native political leaders blithely invoked the 
doctrine of sovereignty as a rationale for otherwise problematic decisions 
involving tribal affairs: 
There has been much discussion in recent years about tribal sovereignty and 
Indian treaty rights. Let me warn you-as in many areas of political discussion, 
this is a conceptually thick forest. It can be beautiful and contain a lot of riches. It 
can also be a hiding place for thieves, robbers, and charlatans. 
The discussion hasn't often enough moved to a level which is truly helpful to 
community leaders and community people. The concept of tribal sovereignty 
means nothing to any of us unless it can help us deal with the survival-threatening 
problems which we face today, unless it contributes to a richer life as we define it 
for our people. 11 
INDIAN POLICY, 1960-1975 (1998); and EMMA R. GROSS, CONTEMPORARY fEDERAL POLICY 
TowARD AMERICAN INDIANS ( 1989) for good treatments of this halcyon period. 
8. 436U.S.49,71-72(1978). 
9. See id. 
10. Sam Deloria, Vine's younger brother, was a significant intellectual figure in his 
own right. See Sam Deloria, Introduction, in INDIAN TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND TREATY 
RIGHTS 23, 23 (La Contluencia 1978). 
11. /d. 
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Similarly, Russel Barsh, writing in 1986, expressed grave concern for 
those Native individuals and governments who became enamored of the 
tribal sovereignty concept. 12 He noted that indigenous peoples 
must be on their guard against the seduction of the European state-idea. In their 
search for conceptual weapons to combat external political intereference [sic], con-
temporary native leaders increasingly describe their own traditional institutions as 
"sovereign" or "state-like," as if it were some kind of defensive shell. But these ... 
concepts can become a "Trojan Horse," ... creating dangerous new systems of 
power in the name of liberation .... 13 
Sandwiched by these two apprehensive statements about how the po-
litical/legal concept of tribal sovereignty might be misused by tribal offi-
cials, Vine Deloria, writing in 1979, offered what might be the most com-
pelling and culturally grounded understanding of the concept from an indig-
enous perspective and argued that when the phrase was immersed in historic 
indigenous values it could be a powerful tool that could bind a community 
together in a most productive manner. 14 He said: 
Sovereignty, in the final instance, can be said to consist more of continued cultural 
integrity than of political powers and to the degree that a nation loses its sense of 
cultural identity, to that degree it suffers a loss of sovereignty. 
When we view sovereignty in this broadly expanded light, new possibilities 
for constructive action arise. Cultural integrity involves a commitment to a central 
and easily understood purpose that motivates a group of people, enables them to 
form efficient, albeit informal social institutions, and provides for them a clear 
identity which cannot be eroded by the passage of events. Sovereignty then re-
volves about the manner in which traditions are developed, sustained, and trans-
formed to confront new conditions. It involves most of all a strong sense of com-
munity discipline and a degree of self-containment and pride that transcends all ob-
jective codes, rules, and regulations. 15 
Vine Deloria's defmition of a culturally-rooted notion of sovereignty 
raises the vital question: What are the criteria that defme what a Native na-
tion is? What, in other words, does it mean to be Seminole, Mohawk, 
Yakama, Chukchansi·, or Narragansett? What are the definitional markers 
that make an indigenous nation just that, indigenous and a nation? What is 
required of each individual to be recognized as a bona fide participant, citi-
zen, or, for lack of a better word, member of a given Native nation? And, 
most essential for purposes of this Article, what are the conditions and con-
sequences that can, and increasingly do, lead to recognized tribal members 
12. Russel Lawrence Barsh, The Nature and Spirit of North American Political 
Systems, 10 AM. INDIAN Q. 181, 195-96 (1986). 
13. /d.atl96. 
14. See Vine Deloria, Jr., Self-Determination and the Concept of Sovereignty, in 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN AMERICAN INDIAN RESERVATIONS 22,22 (Roxanne Dunbar Ortiz 
ed., 1979). 
15. /d.at27. 
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being stripped, exiled, banished, or disenrolled of their indigenous political, 
legal, and cultural identity by their own governments? 
Historically, indigenous lands, languages, spiritual values and tradi-
tions, and kinship systems provided the most recognized frameworks that 
enabled each Native nation, and the individuals, families, and clans consti-
tuting those nations, to generally rest assured in their collective and personal 
identities and not have to wonder about "who" they were. The bonds of 
organic connections were so strong, in fact, that identity crises-be they 
national or individual-were most likely rarely encountered within aborigi-
nal communities. 
Of course, four centuries of interactions with foreign powers have tak-
en a mighty toll on Native peoples, and by the last three decades of the 
twentieth century there were increasing questions regarding how indigenous 
peoples understood who they were and how they were or were not related to 
one another. Writing in 1974, Deloria succinctly noted as much when he 
stated: "The gut question has to do with the meaning of the tribe. Should it 
continue to be a quasi-political entity? Or it could become primarily an eco-
nomic structure. Or it could become, once again, a religious community. 
The future, perhaps the immediate future, will tell." 16 
Native nations, of course, like all human communities, are in a con-
stant state of flux. No nation remains static, and when nations, like indige-
nous peoples, are continuously confronted by more powerful military, eco-
nomic, and constraining legal and political systems like that of the United 
States, then the changes they experience-those demanded of them by the 
State or generated internally as coping mechanisms--can lead to massive 
psychological, social, cultural, political, and economic alterations that can 
have a profound impact on the central identity of Native peoples. 17 
Such appears to be the case in Indian country over one of the most 
critical issues there is: Who belongs to a Native nation and what are the 
grounds upon which that individual's relationship to his or her nation may 
be severed by the governing institutions of that nation? While not as im-
portant as that most fundamental of human rights-the right to life as a free 
human being-the right to belong to a particular indigenous community, 
long viewed as a given by bona fide tribal citizens, has been and remains 
under assault in a number of Native nations. And since the Santa Clara 
case, an ever-increasing number of tribal communities have disenrolled an 
ever-increasing number of otherwise legitimate Native citizens. Such expul-
16. VINE DELORIA, JR., FOR THIS LAND: WRITINGS ON RELIGION IN AMERICA 43 
(James Treated., 1999). 
17. For instance, K. Tsianina Lomawaima conducted an important study on the 
impact of boarding schools on young native minds and souls. See generally K. TSIANINA 
LOMAWAIMA, THEY CALLED IT PRAIRIE LIGHT: THE STORY OF CHILOCCO INDIAN SCHOOL 
(1994). 
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sions are happening for a variety of reasons, but two dominant factors ap-
pear to be the driving forces behind such dismemberments: gambling reve-
nues and criminal activity. 
Native nations have always possessed the inherent authority to dena-
tionalize any tribal member. Moreover, they wield a power, unknown to any 
other sovereign in the United States, to formally exclude non-Natives from 
their territorial homelands. But this Article argues that far too many tribal 
nations are engaging in banishment or disenrollment practices in clear viola-
tion of their own historic values and principles, which at one time utilized 
peace-making, mediation, restitution, and compensation to resolve the inevi-
table disputes that occasionally arose. 18 Historically, though only on rare 
occasions, a tribal member might commit a grievous offense (e.g., pre-
meditated murder) for which he or she might be killed or, in some cases, 
banished-forcibly exiled-if all other attempts to resolve the conflict or 
restore harmony failed. But the available documentary evidence and the oral 
traditions across the hemisphere suggest that given the powerful kinship 
structures evident in virtually all Native nations, draconian policies like the 
formal termination of the political and legal rights of tribal members-
legally referred to as disenrollment after that term first appeared in the 
1930s after the Indian Reorganization Act was voted on by a number of 
tribal nations-was rarely utilized. 
II. THE DISMEMBERING BEGINS 
The history, rationale, and consequences of banishment and disen-
rollments in Indian country have been addressed in previous work, 19 and 
this Article will not repeat those findings. Suffice it to say that since the 
Santa Clara opinion in 1978, (but coinciding most directly with the emer-
gence of high stakes gambling operations authorized under the Indian Gam-
ing Regulatory Act of 1988 and with the dramatically increasing levels of 
criminal activity in Indian country) a number of indigenous governments in 
over a dozen states have been redefining the boundaries and meaning of 
what it means to be a Native citizen by initiating either banishment proceed-
ings or disenrollment procedures, leading to a surge of expulsions of previ-
ously enrolled members. 20 In California alone, the tribal leadership in over 
18. See infra Part II. 
19. See David Wilkins, Self-Determination or Self-Decimation? 'Banishment and 
Disenrol/ment in Indian Country,' INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY (Aug. 30, 2006), 
http://indiancountrytodaymedianetwork.com/ictarchives/2006/08/30/self-determination-or-
self-decimation-banishment-and-disenrollment-in-indian-country-127773; David E. Wilkins, 
Exiling One's Kin: Banishment and Dis enrollment in Indian Country, 17 W. LEGAL HIST. 
235, 235-62 (2004). 
20. See generally Mary Swift, Banishing Habeas Jurisdiction: Why Federal Courts 
Lack Jurisdiction to Hear Tribal Banishment Actions, 86 WASH. L. REV. 941 (2011); Eric 
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fourteen small Native communities i.s leading the charge in the dismember-
ment of their own people. 21 The most disturbing case is that of the Chuk-
chansi people, where more than half the population-! ,000-plus individu-
als-have been formally disenrolled in recent years. 22 
Two events in 1996 first brought this issue to my attention; both in-
volved the banishment of enrolled tribal citizens.23 The first episode cen-
tered on the banishment of one individual, George Whitewolf, a Monacan 
Indian, from Virginia. Whitewolf, a medicine man, and I had been friends 
for over two decades, but when new leadership was elected he found him-
self on the wrong side of their political and spiritual ideology, and he was 
unceremoniously "banished." An outcry from tribal members forced the 
governing body to reconsider, and within a few months he was reinstated. 
Nevertheless, that event and our many conversations about how and why 
the process had unfurled and the psychic pain it caused him and his family 
left a deep imprint on me. 
The second episode, an important federal court ruling also involving 
banishment, occurred among the Seneca of New York. 24 In this case, Pood-
ry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, a federal appellate court ruled 
that five Seneca citizens, who had been permanently banished by the tribal 
government on the grounds that they had allegedly committed '"treason"' 
against the Seneca nation, were entitled to federal review of the tribe's ac-
tion. This was so because banishment was considered a severe enough pun-
ishment involving a sufficient restraint on their liberty and because the ban-
ished members had been evicted without a trial, prior notice, or any other 
form of due process. 25 In the words of Judge Cabranes, this case placed be-
fore the Second Circuit Court of Appeals 
a question of federal Indian law not yet addressed by any federal court: whether an 
Indian stripped of tribal membership and "banished" from a reservation has re-
course in a federal forum to test the legality of the tribe's actions. More specifical-
ly, the issue is whether the habeas corpus provision of the Indian Civil Rights Act 
of 1968 [ICRA] allows a federal court to review punitive measures imposed by a 
Reitman, An Argument for the Partial Abrogation of Federally Recognized Indian Tribes' 
Sovereign Power over Membership, 92 VA. L. REV. 793 (2006) (discussing some of the cur-
rent enrollment disputes). 
21. See Chris Collins, Severed Bloodlines, FRESNO BEE, Mar. I, 2009, at A I. 
22. Telephone Interview with Cathy Cory (Jan. 7, 2012) (disenrolled member of the 
Chukchansi people). 
23. This Article does not address the equally disturbing trend evident in several 
tribal nations, most notably the Cherokee Nation of Oklahoma and the Seminole of Oklaho-
ma, that in recent years have engaged in efforts to formally disenfranchise previously lawful-
ly enrolled members of African-American descent. 
24. Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874 (1996). 
25. /d. at 876-77. 
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tribe upon its members, when those measures involve "banishment" rather than 
imprisonment. 26 
In 1992, the federal district court dismissed the applications of the five 
Seneca, led by Peter L. Poodry, who had been summarily convicted of 
"'treason"' and sentenced to permanent banishment from the reservation 
earlier that year. 27 The petitioners, upon the banishment, had filed applica-
tions in the district court asserting that the Band's banishment order was a 
criminal conviction that violated their rights under the 1968 ICRA. 28 They 
unsuccessfully sought habeas corpus relief, which is provided under that 
Act, with the court concluding "that the threat of permanent banishment was 
not a sufficient restraint on liberty to trigger the application of the ICRA's 
habeas corpus provision."29 
The banished Seneca then appealed this decision to the Second Circuit 
Court of Appeals, which vacated the district court's finding by holding that 
banishment was, indeed, a severe enough punishment involving a sufficient 
restraint on the liberty of those banished to qualify as "detention" and, thus, 
to permit federal review under the ICRA's habeas corpus rule.30 The case 
was sent back down to the district court for a resolution based on the mer-
its. 31 The Second Circuit said, in effect, that the lower court had erred in 
dismissing the banished individuals' petitions for habeas corpus on jurisdic-
tional grounds. 32 This was an important case because the court appeared to 
expand the scope of relief under the ICRA to include review of banishment 
orders. 
The Second Circuit rendered a detailed opinion that addressed the re-
lationship between tribal sovereignty and congressional plenary power; the 
impact of the ICRA and the habeas corpus proviso; and the vitality of the 
Santa Clara precedent. 33 Of importance for this Article is how the court 
addressed the issue of "treason" and the meaning of "banishment" for tribal 
citizens. The Chiefs who had issued the banishment order said that the peti-
tioners had been convicted of treason because they "engaged in 'unlawful 
activities,' including 'actions to overthrow, or otherwise bring about the 
removal of, the traditional government' of the Tonawanda Band."34 
In describing permanent banishment, Judge Cabranes compared it 
with denaturalization proceedings that may be started when individuals have 
obtained U.S. citizenship illegally or through willful misrepresentation and 
26. !d. at 879. 
27. !d. at 876. 
28. /d. 
29. /d. 
30. !d. at 876-77, 882. 
31. !d. at 877. 
32. /d. 
33. /d. at 880-87. 
34. !d. at 889. 
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can be compelled to forfeit their citizenship for having done so. 35 Drawing 
upon Supreme Court precedent, the judge emphasized that "a deprivation of 
citizenship is 'an extraordinarily severe penalty' with consequences that 
'may be more grave than consequences that flow from conviction for 
crimes."'36 And quoting from the former Chief Justice Earl Warren, 
Cabranes wrote that denationalization is the equivalent of the "'total de-
struction ofthe individual's status in organized society."'37 
Having established how devastating the termination of citizenship 
was, Judge Cabranes then described the Senecas' banishment as 
the coerced and peremptory deprivation of the petitioners' membership in the tribe 
and their social and cultural affiliation. To determine the severity of the sanction, 
we need only look to the orders of banishment themselves, which suggest that ban-
ishment is imposed (without notice) only for the most severe of crimes: murder, 
rape, and treason. 38 
In ruling that permanent banishment as a punishment for treason 
amounted to a sufficient restraint on liberty to invoke federal jurisdiction, 
Judge Cabranes reiterated that this was a novel question with potentially 
lasting significance for tribal citizens everywhere. 39 He frankly noted: "This 
is especially true at a time when some Indian tribal communities have 
achieved unusual opportunities for wealth, thereby unavoidably creating 
incentives for dominant elites to 'banish' irksome dissidents for 'treason. "'40 
This was a slightly veiled reference to the significant gaming resources the 
tribes were beginning to pull in. Interestingly, there was no discussion in the 
Cabranes ruling about gaming. Although the Second Circuit concluded that 
the petitioners deserved the right to have the merits of their claims re-heard 
by the district court, it also held that sovereign immunity of the Tonawanda 
Band had to be respected and that the nation could not be sued without its 
express consent. 41 
Finally, Judge Cabranes sent a stem warning to those tribal govern-
ments who attempt to use cultural difference to justify what the judge 
viewed as diminutions of essential civil rights. 42 In the court's words: 
Here, the respondents (Council of Chiefs] adopt a stance of cultural relativism, 
claiming that while "treason" may be a crime under the law of the United States, it 
is a civil matter under tribal law; and that while "banishment" may be thought to be 
35. ld. at 895. 
36. I d. at 895-96 (quoting Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 60 I, 611-12 (1949)). 
37. Jd. at 896 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101-02 {1958)). 
38. ld. at 895. 
39. ld. at 879, 897. 
40. ld. at 897. 
41. Jd. at 899. 
42. ld. at 900. 
334 Michigan State Law Review 2013:325 
a harsh punishment under the law of the United States ... it is necessary to and 
consistent with the culture and tradition of the Tonawanda Band.43 
The court, however, was not persuaded by these cultural arguments. 
While acknowledging that tribes are unique political and cultural entities, it 
more forcefully declared, "The respondents wish to use their connection 
with federal authorities as a sword, while employing notions of cultural 
relativism as a shield from federal court jurisdiction."44 
Judge Cabranes recognized that tribal governments have the right to 
govern, to establish their own criteria for citizenship, and have the power to 
regulate their lands and to exclude outsiders. 45 But he also acknowledged a 
federal responsibility for those American citizens 
subject to tribal authority when that authority imposes criminal sanctions in denial 
of rights guaranteed by the laws of the United States. In sum, there is simply no 
room in our constitutional order for the definition of basic rights on the basis of 
cultural affiliations, even with respect to those communities whose distinctive 
"sovereignty" our country has long recognized and sustained.46 
Ill. WHERE Do WE Go FROM HERE? 
By the late 1990s, a combination of violent crime and illegal drug ac-
tivity-and ever-expanding tribal coffers filled with gaming revenue and 
judgments funds from claims decisions-prompted an increasing number of 
tribal political elites to look to banishments and, increasingly, disenroll-
ments, as two mechanisms that they would use to address the altered socio-
cultural-economic landscape of Indian country. The enormous surge in 
criminal activity led to a small spike in banishments or exclusions on some 
reservations, like the Grand Portage Band of Chippewa, who in 2004 adopt-
ed a new law titled "exclusion" which declared: 
[I]n order to properly secure the peace, health, safety and welfare of the residents 
of and visitors to the band's territory, it is necessary to establish procedures and 
standards for the removal and exclusion from the land subject to the territorial au-
thority of the band those persons whose conduct or associations become intolerable 
to the Community and threaten the peace, health, safety and welfare of the band.47 
Importantly, explicit due process stipulations are spelled out, including 
written notice and a hearing that allows the individual facing exclusion to 
address the council, call witnesses, present evidence, and question and chal-
lenge the witnesses who are testifying against the person to be banished. 48 
43. !d. 
44. !d. 
45. !d. 
46. !d. at 900-01. 
47. Grand Portage Band Code, Exclusion (on file with author). 
48. !d. 
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But it has been the surge of dollars generated by gaming and other 
revenue producing enterprises that has generated a tremendous spike in the 
number of formal disenrollments in a large number of Native communities 
throughout the United States, especially in California. Such denationalizing 
actions by tribal governing officials have often been of a malicious nature 
and have been carried out on the most spurious of grounds-personal feuds, 
greed, political power struggles, etc.-frequently masked by alleged lack of 
blood quantum or alleged errors in the documentary records that are said to 
have allowed ineligible individuals to be enrolled in tribes. 49 
It is this latter category-the much larger category of disenrollments 
of otherwise bona fide tribal members-that is most problematic, because in 
many cases such actions clearly violate the human rights of those disen-
rolled, leaving dismembered individuals tribeless, if not stateless. In many 
of these cases, tribal officials are-without any concern for tribal traditions, 
due process, or civil and political rights-arbitrarily and capriciously disen-
rolling certain tribal members as a means to solidify their own economic 
and political bases and to winnow out opposed individuals or in some cases 
entire families who disapprove of the direction the tribal leadership is head-
ed. 
At the present time, disenrollees have extremely limited rights to chal-
lenge their expulsions under existing federal or tribal law, despite the prom-
ise of the Poodry ruling. A detailed review of much of the case law (federal 
and state) since Poodry50 reveals what Singe I noted in her essay: in virtually 
all of the litigation, federal and state courts have generally adhered to the 
Santa Clara precedent that tribes are the final arbiter of membership deci-
sions and that their sovereign immunity broadly shields them from lawsuits 
filed by tribal members. 51 As the court said in Payer, "[t]he decision of the 
United States Supreme Court in Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez reduces the 
degree of federal interference in tribal government and requires that en-
49. Ian Lovett, Power Struggle over Indian Tribe Splinters into Violence in Califor-
nia, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 29, 2012, at A9. 
50. See, e.g., Alire v. Jackson, 65 F. Supp. 2d 1124 (D. Or. 1999); Moore v. Nelson, 
270 F.3d 789 (9th Cir. 2001); Shenandoah v. Halbritter, 275 F. Supp. 2d 279 (N.D.N.Y. 
2003); Payer v. Turtle Mountain Tribal Council, No. A4-03-105, 2003 WL 22339181 
(D.N.D. Oct. I, 2003); Quair v. Sisco, 359 F. Supp. 2d 948 (E.D. Cal. 2004); Lewis v. Nor-
ton, 424 F.3d 959 (9th Cir. 2005); Lamere v. Superior Court, 131 Cal. App. 4th I 059 (2005); 
Alvarado v. Table Mountain Rancheria, 509 F.3d 1008 (9th Cir. 2007); Salinas v. Barron, 
No. E042846, 2008 WL 699205 (Cal. App. 4th Mar. 17, 2008); Sweet v. Hinzman, 634 F. 
Supp. 2d 1196 (W.O. Wash. 2008); Sweet v. Hinzman, No. C08-844, 2009 WL 1175647 
(W.O. Wash. Apr. 30, 2009); Jeffredo v. Macarro, 590 F.3d 751 (9th Cir. 2009); Cahto Tribe 
of the Laytonville Rancheria v. Dutschke, No. 2:10CV01306, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54398 
(E.D. Cal. May 20, 2011); Cahto Tribe of Laytonville Rancheria v. Dutschke, No. 
2: IOCV01306, 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 108393 (E. D. Cal. Sept. 21, 2011). 
51. Wenona T. Singe!, Indian Tribes and Human Rights Accountability, 49 SAN 
DIEGO L. REV. 567 (2012). 
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forcement of the Indian Civil Rights Act rest primarily in the Tribal 
Courts."52 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Lewis v. Norton in 2005 
was even more blunt in reminding disenrollees of how limited their rights 
were: "Although their claim to membership appears to be a strong one, as 
their father is a recognized member of the tribe, their claim cannot survive 
the double jurisdictional whammy of sovereign immunity and lack of feder-
al court jurisdiction to intervene in tribal membership disputes. " 53 
While most of the judicial precedent continues to vigorously enforce 
the Santa Clara holding, a few judges have more recently begun to contend 
that disenrollees should have more rights under the law to dispute the legal 
termination of their tribal citizenship. In a case involving several Snoqualm-
ie tribal members who had been banished in 2008, Sweet v. Hinzman, a fed-
eral district court ruled that the five banished members' due process rights 
had, indeed, been violated under the ICRA because they had not been given 
adequate notice of a tribal meeting where their permanent banishment was 
determined. 54 Equally important, the court held that the doctrine of tribal 
sovereign immunity did not shield tribal officials "in their official capacity 
for alleged unlawful acts" associated with the banishment proceedings. 55 
And in Jeffredo v. Macarro, a case involving the Pechanga Band of 
Luiseno Mission Indians, Judge Claudia Wilken, in a stirring dissent-after 
noting that the tribe's membership criteria had not been established until 
1979; that the procedures used to disenroll were not put into place until 
1988; and that the "Tribal Council did not begin disenrolling large numbers 
of members until recently, when the Tribe's casino profits became a major 
source of revenue" 56-said: 
Although with disenrollment Appellants retain their United States citizenship and 
will not be physically stateless, they have been stripped of their life-long citizen-
ship and identity as Pechagans. This is more than just a loss of a label, it is a loss of 
a political, ethnic, racial and social association. Such a loss constitutes a restraint 
on liberty that, combined with the actual and potential restraints described above, 
satisfies the detention requirement under§ 1303, in my opinion. 57 
The latter two statements may well be a harbinger of a brewing judi-
cial and national sentiment on this critical subject, since Native individuals 
are not merely tribal citizens but also are state and federal citizens as well. 
Thus, we tum now to Singel's suggestion for an intertribal treaty that 
would, if ever devised, create a new human rights framework for treaty sig-
52. Payer, 2003 WL 22339181, at *6. 
53. 424 F.3d at 960. 
54. 2009 WL 1175647, at *10. 
55. /d. at *5. 
56. 590 F.3d 751, 761 (9th Cir. 2009) (Wilken, J., dissenting). 
57. /d. at 765 (citations omitted). 
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natories that would theoretically provide an indigenous-based remedy for 
disenrolled individuals. 
The idea for such an intertribal mechanism is not new, of course. 
Throughout history there have been several intertribal organs created or 
actively discussed. There have been regional structures like the confederat-
ed governing arrangement established by the Haudenosaunee-Six Na-
tions-who created the Gayanashagowa, or the Great Law of Peace. 58 In the 
Southwest, nineteen of the Pueblo peoples created the All Indian Pueblo 
Council in 1598 that enabled them to deal intergovemmentally with the 
Spanish, Mexican, and later the federal and state govemments. 59 And in 
1870, fifteen Native nations centered in what became known as Oklahoma 
organized an intertribal charter known as the Okmulgee Constitution. 60 Alt-
hough it was never ratified by all the tribes, it established a diplomatic prec-
edent that would later reemerge in 1906 with the writing of a constitution 
for numerous tribes in the same territory who set out to create an indigenous 
state that would have been called Sequoyah. 61 
And historically, Native nations had long engaged in diplomatic af-
fairs with one another, and they vigorously carried on that tradition when 
European states began to arrive. 62 While many Native peoples agreed to 
surrender the right to negotiate treaties with other foreign powers as part of 
their negotiations with the United States, they never surrendered, as Deloria 
reminded us on several occasions, the right to negotiate treaties with other 
Native nations. 63 Deloria and DeMallie, for example, in their important trea-
ty study remarked: 
Intertribal treaties and agreements represent a wide variety of situations. 
Sometimes the Indians resolved boundary disputes; at other times they agreed to 
share hunting and fishing areas. Still other occasions called for sharing annuities or 
guaranteeing that whites would not be molested in their lands .... Intertribal trea-
ties and agreements still have considerable importance. No case Jaw has ever sug-
gested that any Indian nation surrendered the right or power to make treaties with 
another Indian nation, even though the federal government itself insisted that trea-
ties with Indians could no longer be made by the United States. In these days of 
consortiums and combinations of tribes for various purposes, tribal councils should 
seriously consider the feasibility of conducting their own form of diplomacy with 
other Indian nations. 64 
58. DAVID E. WILKINS, DOCUMENTS OF NATIVE AMERICAN POLITICAL 
DEVELOPMENT: 1500s TO 1933, at 14-37 (2009). 
59. /d. at 37. 
60. For a copy of this constitution, see WILKINS, supra note 58, at 133-41. 
61. See WILKINS, supra note 58, at 299-359. 
62. See generally I VINE DELORIA, JR. & RAYMOND DEMALLIE, DOCUMENTS OF 
AMERICAN INDIAN DIPLOMACY: TREATIES, AGREEMENTS, AND CONVENTIONS, 1775-1979 
(1999). 
63. /d. at 680-81. 
64. !d. at 681. 
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More recently, on August 1, 2007, an even broader based international 
protocol was adopted by representatives from eleven Native nations from 
the United States, Canada, New Zealand, and Australia. 65 This treaty the-
matically focuses on cultural property, protection of lands and other natural 
resources, and trade and commerce.66 This accord builds upon Deloria's 
admonitions and could prove a useful model for those U.S. based Native 
nations who question whether such an international protocol is feasible. 
CONCLUSION 
Simply put, there is no shortage of diplomatic precedents available for 
those Native leaders who might be willing to support the much needed hu-
man rights framework that Singel is calling for. The question is whether 
there is sufficient political and moral will among indigenous leaders for 
such a treaty? Singel's arguments for why we need such a protocol are 
compelling to me-as a Native academic. But tribal leaders answer to a 
different set of constituencies. I am convinced that until and unless the 
United States Congress or, more likely, the United States Supreme Court, 
steps in and hands down a deeply invasive law or ruling that profoundly 
diminishes or even eliminates the heart of a core sovereign power, like the 
power to decide to who belongs to a tribal nation, most Native leaders will 
be unwilling to yield any of their inherent autonomy to construct such an 
intertribal protocol for fear that it will hasten the decline of their sovereign 
authority. 
While we live in an increasingly interconnected and interdependent 
world, far too many tribal leaders are overly committed to an outmoded and 
archaic definition of sovereignty that refuses to concede that the world is, in 
fact, interdependent and interrelated. Until and unless we move away from 
such absolutist definitions and agree to forge a viable intertribal body that 
provides a much stronger set of protections for the rights of all individuals 
subject to tribal authority, we will be in danger of replicating many of the 
kinds of abuses we once fairly accused the United States of engaging in. 
65. United League of Indigenous Nations Treaty, Aug. I, 2007, available at 
http://www.indigenousnationstreaty.org/about-ulin/the-treaty/. 
66. !d. 
